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Null-hypothesis significance testingA difficulty for reports of subliminal priming is demonstrating that participants who actu-
ally perceived the prime are not driving the priming effects. There are two conventional
methods for testing this. One is to test whether a direct measure of stimulus perception
is not significantly above chance on a group level. The other is to use regression to test if
an indirect measure of stimulus processing is significantly above zero when the direct mea-
sure is at chance. Here we simulated samples in which we assumed that only participants
who perceived the primes were primed by it. Conventional analyses applied to these sam-
ples had a very large error rate of falsely supporting subliminal priming. Calculating a
Bayes factor for the samples very seldom falsely supported subliminal priming. We con-
clude that conventional tests are not reliable diagnostics of subliminal priming. Instead,
we recommend that experimenters calculate a Bayes factor when investigating subliminal
priming.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Exposure to a perceivable stimulus may influence or ‘‘prime” a response to another stimulus, even when the priming
stimulus is just noticeable. More controversial are claims of priming induced by imperceptible or ‘‘subliminal” (i.e., below
the threshold of perception) stimuli. Although many studies claim to have demonstrated subliminal priming, the phe-
nomenon is still debated (Newell & Shanks, 2014). The debate continues because it is difficult to prove the subliminal part
of the claim–that the prime stimulus was not perceived, not even slightly, by any observer–and thereby to rule out an alter-
native explanation of the observed priming: that it is solely attributable to the responses of observers who just barely per-
ceived the prime.
The main strategy to find support for subliminal priming has been to try to demonstrate a dissociation between a direct
measure of prime stimulus perception and an indirect measure of prime stimulus processing (Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
Two statistical methods are conventionally used to find statistical support for dissociation: a double t-test and a regression
method. Here we simulate these methods and a less often used method based on Bayesian statistics. The simulations suggest
that the latter method, but not the former methods, is suitable for evaluating whether experimental data support subliminal
priming.
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In a typical experiment examining subliminal priming, a sequence of stimuli is shown in each trial. First, one of two prim-
ing stimuli is briefly flashed, followed by a masking stimulus (to allow the priming stimulus to be processed but not per-
ceived), and then a target stimulus is shown. Observers have two tasks in the experiment, one direct task regarding the
prime stimulus (the direct measure) and one indirect task regarding the target stimulus (the indirect measure). In a typical
experiment, the tasks are performed in separate blocks, beginning with the indirect task.
In the direct task, observers decide which of the two possible priming stimuli was presented. For example, in a study by
Kiefer, Sim, and Wentura (2015), the priming stimulus was an emotionally positive or negative stimulus and the direct task
was to decide whether the prime stimulus was positive or negative. In analyzing data from such tasks, one of the two stimuli
may be arbitrarily designated the ‘‘signal” and the other the ‘‘non-signal,” and the four possible stimulus answer combina-
tions may be classified as hits (responding ‘‘signal” to the ‘‘signal stimulus”), misses, false alarms (responding ‘‘signal” to
‘‘non-signal” stimulus), and correct rejections. According to signal detection theory, the observer’s sensitivity, d0, to differ-
ences between the two stimuli is d0 =U1(ph) U1(pf), where ph is the proportion of hits, pf the proportion of false alarms,
and U1 is the inverse standard normal cumulative distribution function (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Response bias, that
is, the tendency to choose one over the other stimulus, may be quantified as the response criterion, i.e., c = ½[U1(ph)
+U1(pf)]. For an unbiased observer, c = 0, because the proportions of hits and correct rejections are equal. In typical exper-
iments, the direct measure of prime stimulus perception is d0.
The indirect task varies depending on the type of priming the experimenter is examining. In a typical experiment, the
indirect measure of prime stimulus processing is a congruency effect on reaction time for responses to the indirect task.
Kiefer et al. (2015), also used a positive or negative stimulus as the target stimulus and the direct task was to decide whether
the target stimulus was positive or negative. When the priming stimulus was incongruent with the target stimulus, the reac-
tion time in the task was slower than if the priming and target stimuli were congruent. This type of congruency effect is the
indirect measure of prime stimulus processing in typical experiments.
1.2. Statistical analysis of subliminal priming
The most common analytical method, here called the double t-test method, is to apply two t-tests, one for each of the two
measures, and decide for or against subliminal priming based on the pattern of the p-values (see Table 1), typically using
a = 0.05. Specifically, the double t-test method declares subliminal priming if (a) mean performance in the direct measure
does not differ statistically significantly from chance (p > a) and (b) the mean effect in the indirect measure does differ sta-
tistically significantly from zero (p < a).
The double t-test method is open to criticism on statistical grounds, because deciding whether the prime stimulus is sub-
liminal is based on an unjustified interpretation of how the obtained p-values relate to the tested null hypothesis, H0: ‘‘True
mean d0 = 0.” Specifically, the p-value is the conditional probability of obtaining the data or more extreme data given H0 [P(D|
H0)], and therefore say nothing about the probability of H0 [P(H0)] (see e.g., Dienes (2014) and Gallistel (2009) for a good
discussion of null hypothesis testing in the context of non-significant results). The double t-test method has also been crit-
icized as the method often lacks the power needed to support that observers were subliminal (e.g., Finkbeiner & Coltheart,
2014; Gallistel, 2009; Macmillan, 1986; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Pratte, 2007; Wiens, 2006). Proponents of the double t-
test method are also of course aware of this, but would argue that the strategy still can, and indeed does, do a good job of
identifying subliminal priming. Therefore, the double t-test remains the most popular analytical method in research into
subliminal priming (e.g., González-García, Tudela, & Ruz, 2015; Huang, Tan, Soon, & Hsieh, 2014; Jusyte & Schönenberg,
2014; Kido & Makioka, 2015; Kiefer et al., 2015; Lin & Murray, 2015; Marcos Malmierca, 2015; Norman, Heywood, &
Kentridge, 2015; Ocampo, 2015; Ocampo, Al-Janabi, & Finkbeiner, 2015; Schoeberl, Fuchs, Theeuwes, & Ansorge, 2015;
Wildegger, Myers, Humphreys, & Nobre, 2015).
The double t-test method tests for subliminal priming at a group level. Observers, however, differ in their thresholds (e.g.,
Albrecht & Mattler, 2012; Dagenbach, Carr, & Wilhelmsen, 1989; Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 1995; Haase & Fisk, 2015;
Sand, 2016). To take individual differences in thresholds (and thus perception, given a specific prime stimulus intensity) into
account, another conventional analysis is regression analysis (e.g., Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Ocampo, 2015; Schoeberl
et al., 2015; Xiao & Yamauchi, 2014). In regression analysis, the direct measure is used as the regressor and the indirect mea-
sure is the outcome variable. Specifically, the regression method declares subliminal priming if the intercept is statistically
significantly above zero. Because these two conventional methods (double t-test and regression) remain popular today, we
tested their robustness through simulations in which we assumed no dissociation between the direct and indirect measures.
One analytical strategy not yet in widespread use is to calculate a Bayes factor to test whether or not a prime stimulus is
subliminal at a group level. Calculating a Bayes factor, B, is the Bayesian equivalent of a null hypothesis significance test. The
improvement of Bayesian statistics over null-hypothesis testing here is that B can lend support to H0 (which the p-value can-
not) and H0 is what experimenters in this field want to support (Dienes, 2015). To calculate B, an a priori model of H1 (‘‘True
mean d0 slightly above 0”) needs to be specified. (See Dienes, 2015, for a discussion of how H1 can be specified with regard to
subliminal priming.) Once H1 is specified, B can be calculated and it is the ratio of the likelihood of the observed data based
on the two hypotheses, that is, P(D|H1)/P(D|H0). B > 1 thus indicates that the data support H1 over H0, while B < 1 indicates
that the data support H0 over H1, and a B of approximately 1 suggests that the experiment was not sensitive. Although B is
Table 1
Possible outcomes of the different analytical methods.
Analytical method
Double t-test method Indirect measure Direct measure
p > 0.05 p < 0.05
p > 0.05 No subliminal priming No supraliminal priming
p < 0.05 Subliminal priming Supraliminal priming
Mixed method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 B > 1/3
p > 0.05 No subliminal priming Collect more data or no supraliminal priming
p < 0.05 Subliminal priming Collect more data or supraliminal priming
Double B method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 Inconclusive B > 3
B < 1/3 No subliminal priming Collect more data No supraliminal priming
Inconclusive Collect more data Collect more data Collect more data
B > 3 Subliminal priming Collect more data Supraliminal priming
Note. The outcome of interest is marked in bold in this and the following tables. p > 0.05 = failing to reject H0; p < 0.05 = reject H0; B < 1/3 = data support H0;
B > 3 = data support H1.
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can be considered ‘‘substantial” evidence for H0 (Jeffreys, 1998). This criteria of B > 3 roughly corresponds to an a level of
0.05. We follow these criteria here when evaluating B. By calculating B, then, experimenters can test whether the data sup-
port subliminal priming (see Table 1).
Curiously, a mixed strategy has also been used in which the direct measure is tested using B, whereas a p-value is still
used to test the indirect measure (e.g., Norman et al., 2015). This mixed method is probably used because the main advan-
tage of B over the p-value is when H0 is the hypothesis of interest. Here we compare how these two newer methods, which
we call the double Bmethod and the mixed method, perform when applied to the same samples as used in the conventional
tests of subliminal priming.
2. Simulation procedure
We used simulations to evaluate the various scenarios described below. A simulation approach is motivated by the math-
ematical complexity of the scenarios, involving discrete and asymmetric distributions of observed d0 values (cf Miller, 1996).
Using the statistical software R (see Electronic Supplementary Material for all scripts), we simulated scenarios in which we
assumed no dissociation between the direct and indirect measures. The purpose of the simulations was to evaluate the
extent to which the different analytical methods would incorrectly provide support for subliminal priming although all
priming was actually supraliminal, that is, only participants who truly perceived the prime stimulus were primed by it.
Following Miller (2000), we simulated an experiment in which d0 was used as a measure of an observer’s ability to detect
a prime stimulus (direct measure of perception, d0d) and of the priming effect of the same stimulus on the observer’s perfor-
mance on a related task (indirect measure of processing, d0i). Simulation 4 differs in that we used a congruency effect on reac-
tion time as the indirect measure. (For an example experiment using d0 as both the direct and indirect measures, see
Greenwald et al., 1995.) In the simulations, true sensitivity will be measured for each observer using a number, nd and ni,
of two alternative forced-choice trials. This means that observed sensitivity will be a result of true sensitivity and random
error in the measurement. We will denote the observed sensitivity d0 to distinguish it from true sensitivity, d0.
2.1. Assumptions
The simulations were based on the following assumptions: (a) Performance on both the direct and indirect measures fol-
lows from the assumptions of the Gaussian equal-variance model of signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).
(b) The observed d0-values are composed of a true component, d0 (true sensitivity), and an error component that is indepen-
dent of the true sensitivity and has an expected value of zero. (c) An observer’s true sensitivity remained constant during all
trials of the experiment.1 (d) Observers’ true response criteria in both measures were unbiased, c = 0.2 (e) In all simulations,
except the last, d0d = d0 i. This implies absence of subliminal priming, because priming (d0 i > 0) only happened for observers
who perceived the prime stimulus (d0d > 0). (f) All N observers provided one observed d0d, based on nd trials used to measure
direct prime stimulus perception, and one observed d0 i, based on ni trials used to measure indirect prime stimulus processing.1 See below for a discussion of the impact of non-constant sensitivity.
2 See Electronic Supplementary Material for the impact of a biased criterion.
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The simulation procedure was as follows. (1) Observers d0d and d0i were sampled randomly from a specified bivariate dis-
tribution of d0-values (d0d = d0i in all except Simulation 5). The observers’ response criteria in the two measures were set to
zero (i.e., cd = ci = 0). (2) A true probability correct score was calculated for each observer from the true d0-values. For an unbi-
ased observer (c = 0), the true proportion correct isU(d0/2) whereU is the standard normal cumulative distribution function
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Thus, pd =U(d0d/2) and pi =U(d0i/2). (3) The observed proportion of hits in the direct measure
(phd) was simulated for each observer by randomly drawing a number from the binomial distribution based on pd and nd/2
and dividing that number by nd/2. The observed proportion of false alarms in the direct measure (pfd) was similarly simulated
based on 1  pd and nd/2. We simulated proportion hits and false alarms in the indirect measure in the same way. Observed
proportions were determined from true scores plus the random error inherent in the set of binomial trials. (4) We calculated
d0d as U1(phd) U1(p fd) and d0 i as U1(phi) U1(pfi). (5) We subjected the set of d0d and d0i to the analyses of interest and
stored the exact p-value and corresponding B. (6) We repeated steps one to five 10,000 times and used the stored p-values
and B to calculate the proportions of each analytical outcome.
To calculate B, we needed to specify both H0 and H1. H0 is easy to specify in the present application, namely true d0d = 0
and true d0i = 0 for the direct and indirect tests, respectively. For H1, the a priori probability of different possible population
values needs to be specified. We wanted to specify H1 for the effect ‘‘observers (at a mean level) were marginally able to
perceive the prime stimulus but lower sensitivities are more likely than higher sensitivities”. Based on previous experimen-
tal conditions using very difficult to perceive but not subliminal stimuli (e.g., Atas, Vermeiren, & Cleeremans, 2013; Haase &
Fisk, 2015; Sand, 2016; Schoeberl et al., 2015), we chose to represent this using a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 0.2 but with the probability of values below 0 set to 0 (i.e., a half-normal distribution). That is, H1 was
‘‘true mean d0 slightly above zero, with larger d0 having smaller probabilities and d0 > 0.4 being improbable”; i.e., using the
notation from Dienes (2015) we used a BH(0,0.2) to specify H1.
3. Simulation 1: Discrete distribution of d0
In the first simulation, we assumed a discrete bivariate distribution of true sensitivities in which 60% of observers could
not perceive the prime stimulus and were not primed by it (d0d = d0i = 0) and 40% of observers could marginally perceive the
prime stimulus and were primed by it (d0d = d0i = 0.2). This unrealistic but simple distribution was chosen to illustrate how
random error will influence observed scores. In this simulation, 40 observers were drawn from this distribution (i.e., 24
observers d0d = d0i = 0 and 16 observers d0d = d0i = 0.2). In this simulation, true mean d0s across observers was thus 0.08
(0.2  0.4). Observed d0d was based on nd = 100 trials and d0i was based on ni = 200 trials, as previous studies have typically
used more trials in the indirect than the direct task (e.g., Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Kiefer et al., 2015; Lin & Murray, 2015;
Ocampo, 2015; Schoeberl et al., 2015).
Fig. 1 illustrates one sample drawn from this distribution. Although d0d = d0i assumed only two values (0 or 0.2), random
error arising from the limited number of trials introduced variation in observed scores (Fig. 1A and B). In this sample,
mean d0d was 0.04 (SE = 0.04) and mean d0i was 0.07 (SE = 0.03). We applied the double t-test method, mixed method
and double B method to these data to compare the three methods. The double t-test resulted in p-values of 0.36 for d0d
and 0.02 for d0i (illustrated in Fig. 1C as 95% confidence intervals). The double t-test method would therefore falsely indi-
cate that subliminal priming occurred in this sample. Calculating B for the direct measure (with BH(0,0.2)) resulted in a B of
0.51. This B does not suggest that the sample was subliminal but rather that the data are inconclusive (encouraging exper-
imenters to collect more data; a valid procedure using Bayesian statistics, Dienes, 2011). Thus, neither the mixed method
nor double B method would support subliminal priming for this data-set. This simulation example (Fig. 1) followed the
expected pattern of the results of 10,000 simulations (Table 2). This result suggests that the conventional double t-test
method is unreliable but that calculating B for the direct measure is more reliable. Because the double B method reaches
much the same conclusion as does the mixed method, we will omit reporting the results of the mixed method in the fol-
lowing simulations.
4. Simulation 2: Half-normal distribution of observer sensitivities
The discrete bivariate distribution of true sensitivities used in the previous simulation is of course not realistic. A more
realistic distribution would include variation in true sensitivities between observers. True d0-values below zero are implau-
sible in most applications, however, because a negative true d0 would imply that the non-target stimulus on average
evoked stronger evidence for the target stimulus than did the target stimulus itself, or vice versa. Observed d0-values
slightly below zero may of course occur due to random error. Therefore, in Simulation 2, a half-normal distribution with
parameters l = 0 and r = 0.1 (corresponding to the standard deviation of the full normal)3 was used for d0d = d0 i. In this sim-
ulation, true mean d0s across observers were 0.08. Otherwise, this simulation was identical to Simulation 1. We applied the3 Note that when l = 0, the truncated, half-normal and folded normal distributions are identical.
Fig. 1. Influence of random error. (A) True d0d and observed d0d. (B) True d0 i and observed d0 i. (C) Illustration of double t-tests applied to this sample through
95% confidence intervals for d0d (bottom inset) and d0 j (left inset). Perceivers (d0d = d0 i = 0.2; 60%) and non-perceivers (d0d = d0 i = 0; 40%) are shown as black
triangles and gray circles (for visibility, data points are slightly displaced horizontally). N = 40; 100 direct trials (nd) and 200 indirect trials (ni); d0d = true
direct sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed indirect sensitivity.
Table 2
Proportion of samples classified in each outcome category (see Table 1) in simulation 1.
Analytical method
Double t-test method Indirect measure Direct measure
p > 0.05 p < 0.05
p > 0.05 16% 13%
p < 0.05 40% 30%
Mixed method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 B > 1/3
p > 0.05 2% 28%
p < 0.05 5% 66%
Double B method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 Inconclusive B > 3
B < 1/3 0% 1% 1%
Inconclusive 2% 16% 14%
B > 3 5% 33% 28%
Note. N = 40. For 60% of observers d0d = d0 i = 0 and 40% d0d = d0 i = 0.2; d0d and d0 i were observed based on nd = 100 trials and ni = 200 trials, respectively. The
three analyses were applied to the observed scores, this being repeated 10,000 times. d0d = true direct sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d =
observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed indirect sensitivity. To measure variability in the simulation we ran 1000 iterations of Simulation 1 with 10,000
repetitions each. The standard deviation for the probability of false support using the double t-test method (mean = 40%) was very small, 0.005%-points.
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group analysis) sometimes used to strengthen the support for subliminal priming and the regression method mentioned
above.
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The result of applying the double t-test and double B method is summarized in Table 3. Again, the double t-test method
would often encourage experimenters to wrongly conclude that subliminal priming had occurred. In comparison, the double
B method would often encourage experimenters to collect more data or to conclude that the priming was supraliminal. As
Bayesian statistics is relatively insensitive to stopping rules, simply collecting more data when B is inconclusive (1/3 > B > 3)
is a valid procedure (Dienes, 2011). To test the robustness of this approach we assumed that in the samples B was inconclu-
sive with regards to d0d (7.81%), researchers would test more observers, reanalyze their data after each observer and stop
when a decisive B was reached. Using such a stopping rule would increase false support of H0 (B < 1/3) to 8.29%. As such,
even when using such an ‘‘extreme” stopping rule, the double B approach would outperform the double t-test approach.
4.2. Subgroup analysis
As experimenters are aware of the problems associated with claiming that a prime stimulus is subliminal based on a non-
significant p-value, experimenters sometimes perform an additional analysis to support their conclusion. We call this anal-
ysis subgroup analysis and it entails dividing participants based on their observed d0d and basing the t-tests only on those
who perform close to chance (e.g., Huang, Lu, & Dosher, 2012; Lin & Murray, 2015; Marcos Malmierca, 2015; Palmer &
Mattler, 2013; Züst et al., 2015). The idea behind this is straight forward: If the indirect effect is apparent in the subgroup
that performs worse, then the effect should be subliminal. How ‘‘performance close to chance” is operationalized varies
between studies (e.g., based on median split of d0d or on the binomial distribution). To test this analysis in this simulation,
for each sample, we excluded participants performing above the 97.5th percentile of expected d0d given d0d and 100 trials
(subsampling based on other cut-offs led to similar results). We then applied the double t-test and double B only on the
remaining subsample. In different samples between 0 and 25% of observers were excluded in this manner (mean 6%, stan-
dard deviation 4%-points).
The result is not encouraging for the subgroup analysis. The double t-test method suggested subliminal priming in 54% of
the subsamples and the double B method suggested subliminal priming in 17% of the subsamples. Both methods therefore
perform worse when applied to a subgroup of participants than to the full sample.4 The reason for this is regression to the
mean. Although d0d and d0i are perfectly correlated in this simulation, d0d and d0i are not (see Fig. 1). As such, an observer with
a d0d of 0.2 may, due to random error, produce a d0d close to chance. However, the same observer is unlikely to be as unlucky in
d0 i, and is therefore more likely to perform close to his or her true sensitivity (d0 i = 0.2). As such, subgroup analysis based on d0d
trivially leads to a non-significant direct measure (or B < 1/3) without guaranteeing only subliminal effects in the indirect
measure. For a Bayesian approach to sorting participants as subliminal or not, see Morey, Rouder, and Speckman (2009).
4.3. Regression method
Another method of testing subliminal priming is via regression analysis. This method is sometimes used as the main anal-
ysis or as an additional analysis after the double t-test method (e.g., Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Ocampo, 2015; Schoeberl
et al., 2015; Xiao & Yamauchi, 2014). In this analysis, d0d is used as the regressor and d0i as the outcome variable. The idea is
that if priming is independent of awareness then (a) the intercept should be above zero and/or (b) there should be no cor-
relation between d0d and d0i. We are sympathetic to this method as the idea is to take individual variability in prime percep-
tion (d0d) into account. However, using simulations, Dosher (1998) and Miller (2000) have already demonstrated that
regression analysis is not robust in this application. In short, random error in the predictor variable leads to underestimation
of the correlation and, in turn, an overestimation of the intercept.
One criticism of Miller’s simulations was that they were based on very large sample sizes irrelevant to most actual exper-
iments (Klauer & Greenwald, 2000). Therefore, we decided to replicate Miller’s results by applying regression analysis in this
simulation, where N = 40. Recall that in this simulation we assumed a perfect correlation between d0d and d0i and an intercept
of zero. Regression analysis using null-hypothesis significance testing applied on the observed scores, however, resulted in
66% statistically significant intercepts and 62% non-significant correlations. We therefore verify that Miller’s conclusions are
also valid for sample sizes more common in experiments.
Having previously seen that the Bayesian approach performed better than the double t-test, we also decided to test the
intercept by calculating B (with BH(0,0.2)). Here, however, when H1 was the hypothesis of interest, the Bayesian approach did
not outperform conventional tests but resulted in 61% of intercepts supporting subliminal priming (B > 3). The reason that
the regression approach is not reliable is error in the regressor. Therefore, to take error in both variables into account, we also
tested the application of an orthogonal (Deming) regression (Ripley & Thompson, 1987). We then tested the resulting inter-4 A Bayesian approach to subsampling could be to only include observers whose d0d are more likely (B < 1/3) given d0d = 0 than larger d0d. Based on our model
of H1 very few d0d (0.05%) would be included in such a subsample and thus almost no false support of subliminal priming would occur. This is because with 100
trials, the standard deviation of d0d for d0d = 0 is 0.25 (Miller, 1996). Thus, d0d between 0.5 and 0.5 are all quite likely given d0d = 0 and conversely, d0d of 0 is
quite likely given d0d = 0.5 (sd = 0.26). The number of trials often used in experiments are simply too few to reliably determine if an d0d is caused by a d0d of zero
or more. Excluding d0d based on the binomial distribution corresponds to excluding d0d for which B > 3.
Table 3
Proportion of samples classified in each outcome category (see Table 1) in simulation 2.
Analytical method
Double t-test method Indirect measure Direct measure
p > 0.05 p < 0.05
p > 0.05 14% 10%
p < 0.05 38% 37%
Double B method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 Inconclusive B > 3
B < 1/3 0% 2% 1%
Inconclusive 2% 13% 11%
B > 3 5% 32% 34%
Note. Forty observers’ true d0s were drawn from a bivariate distribution with l = 0 and r = 0.1 truncated at 0. d0d = d0 i. d0d and d0 i were observed based on
nd = 100 trials and ni = 200 trials, respectively The three analyses were applied to the observed scores, this being repeated 10,000 times. d0d = true direct
sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed indirect sensitivity.
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(B > 3) of intercepts still supported subliminal priming. In conclusion, we agree with Dosher and Miller that regression anal-
ysis is not a robust way of testing subliminal priming.5. Simulations 3A and 3B: Varying parameters
A strength, but also a difficulty, of simulation is that it forces the researchers to explicitly specify all the assumptions on
which a simulation is based. Of importance here is the underlying distribution of d0d and d0i. This distribution varies between
experiments and, in any case, the true underlying distributions are unknown. Furthermore, experiments vary in their sample
size (N) and number of trials (n) used. Therefore, we decided to vary these parameters based on previous studies (e.g.,
González-García et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2014; Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Kido & Makioka, 2015; Kiefer et al., 2015;
Lin & Murray, 2015; Marcos Malmierca, 2015; Norman et al., 2015; Ocampo, 2015; Ocampo et al., 2015; Schoeberl et al.,
2015; Wildegger et al., 2015) systematically in two simulations.
5.1. Simulation 3A
In Simulation 3A, we varied the underlying distribution of d0 and the sample size (N). We varied the underlying distribution
by using various r’s of the half-normal distributions, as shown in Fig. 2A. We then sampled from these distributions using
various values of N. In all other respects, this simulation was identical to Simulation 2. For each combination of distribution
and sample size, we ran 10,000 simulations. For each simulation, we applied the double t-test and double Bmethod and noted
the probability of false support for subliminal priming (p > 0.05 for d0d and p < 0.05 for d0i or B < 1/3 for d0d and B > 3 for d0i).
Fig. 2B and C summarizes the results of this simulation. The y-axis shows the probability of false support for subliminal
priming. For the double t-test method, there is a curvilinear relationship between the two parameters and false support: As
the r or N increases, the power of the indirect measures increases and thus also the proportion of support for subliminal
priming. As the parameters increase beyond a certain point, however, the power of the direct measure also increases and
the proportion of support for subliminal priming decreases. As for the double Bmethod (Fig. 2C), this method is more robust
under all parameter settings.
5.2. Simulation 3B
In the simulations so far, more trials were used for the indirect than the direct measure, as this is a common practice in
experiments (e.g., Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Kiefer et al., 2015; Lin & Murray, 2015; Schoeberl et al., 2015). The difference
in the number of trials results in smaller error (and thus more power) in the indirect than the direct measure. To test the
impact of this, in Simulation 3B we therefore systematically varied nd and ni. In all other respects, however, the simulation
was identical to Simulation 2. For each combination of nd and ni we applied the double t-test and double Bmethod and noted
the probability of false support for subliminal priming.
Fig. 3A and B summarizes the results of this simulation. The y-axis shows the probability of false support for subliminal
priming. For the double t-test method, although a greater number of nd and ni reinforces the probability of false support, an
equal number of trials does not completely eliminate the issue (24% and 18% false support when nd = ni = 100 and 200,
respectively). With this particular distribution and N, approximately 400 nd were necessary to reduce the proportion of false
support for subliminal priming to 5%. As for the double Bmethod, this method is again more robust under all parameter set-
tings. The use of too few trials will usually result in a B encouraging experimenters to collect more data.
Fig. 2. Summary of Simulation 3A. (A) The four half-normal distributions used in Simulation 3A. Note that true d0d = true d0 i. Also note that negative true d0s
cannot arise in these half-normal distributions. (B) Probability of support for subliminal priming (y-axis; see text for details) based on the double t-test
method applied to samples of various sizes (x-axis) drawn from half-normal distributions with various r’s (lines). The straight gray line illustrates an error
rate of 5%. (C) As in Fig. 2B, except that the double B method is used. Each data point is based on 10,000 simulations. d0d and d0 i were observed based on
nd = 100 trials and ni = 200 trials, respectively. d0d = true direct sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed
indirect sensitivity.
Fig. 3. Summary of Simulation 3B. (A) Probability of support for subliminal priming (y-axis; see text for details) based on the double t-test method applied
to various numbers of direct trials (x-axis) and indirect trials (lines). Symbols in gray color illustrate that the same number of trials was used in the direct
and indirect measure. The straight line illustrates an error rate of 5%. (B) As in (A), except that the double Bmethod is used. N = 40. True d0d and d0 i are drawn
from a half-normal distribution with r = 0.1. Each data point is based on 10,000 simulations. d0d and d0 i were observed based on nd and ni trials, respectively.
d0d = true direct sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed indirect sensitivity.
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In the previous simulations d0 has been used for both the direct and indirect measures. This simplifies the presentation
because the outcomes of both measures are on the same scale. In actual experiments a more common indirect measure is a
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of the previous simulations generalize to experiments using a congruency effect as the indirect measure.
Simulation 4 was identical to Simulation 1 except that the indirect measure was a congruency effect between median RT
in incongruent – congruent trials. To simplify the simulation, we used the discrete distribution of d0d used in Simulation 1:
that is, two types of observers were simulated, perceivers (40%, d0d = 0.2) and non-perceivers (60%, d0d = 0). We assumed no
dissociation between the direct and indirect measures. In short, perceivers had a true congruency effect and non-perceivers
did not.
An ex-Gaussian distribution, i.e., a mixture of a normal and an exponential distribution, was used to model the positive
skewness of RT data. The parameter values of the ex-Gaussian distribution are the l and r of the normal distribution and the
mean of the exponential distribution. Here we obtained parameter values fromMiller (1988). For all participants, RTs in con-
gruent trials were drawn from an ex-Gaussian distribution with l = 300 and r = 50 and a mean of the exponential distribu-
tion of 300.
As non-perceivers could not differentiate congruent and incongruent trials, their RT in incongruent trials was drawn from
the same distribution as for congruent trials. Thus, non-perceivers’ true congruency effect was 0 ms. As perceivers could per-
ceive the prime, their true RT was modeled as slower in incongruent than congruent trials and was drawn from an ex-
Gaussian distribution with l = 450 and r = 50 and a mean of the exponential distribution of 150 ms. That is, perceivers’ true
median difference (congruency effect) was 48 ms. In this simulation, true mean d0d across observers was thus 0.08 (0.2  0.4)
and true mean across observers RT effect was 19.2 ms (48  0.4). This is representative of priming effect sizes previously
reported in studies of subliminal priming (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; Van den Bussche, Van
den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009). For all observers, 100 trials were used to sample RT from the relevant distribution in each
condition.
Table 4 summarizes the results of applying the double t-test and double B method in the two simulations. To calculate B
for the indirect effect, H1 was specified as a normal distribution with a mean of 30 ms and a standard deviation of 10 ms (i.e.,
BN(30,10); for d0d BH(0,0.2)). This model of H1 was based on priming effect sizes previously reported in studies of subliminal
priming (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; Van den Bussche et al., 2009). As we can see, the results
of the previous simulations generalized to a simulation using a congruency effect on RT as the indirect measure.Table 4
Proportion of samples classified in each outcome category (see Table 1) in simulation 4.
Analytical method
Double t-test method Indirect measure Direct measure
p > 0.05 p < 0.05
p > 0.05 14% 11%
p < 0.05 43% 33%
Double B method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 Inconclusive B > 3
B < 1/3 0% 1% 1%
Inconclusive 1% 9% 7%
B > 3 6% 41% 34%
Note. N = 40. For 60% of observers d0d = 0 and there was no true congruency effect, while for 40% of observers d0d = 0.2 and there was a true congruency
effect; see text for details. d0d and the congruency effect were observed based on nd = 100 trials and ni = 200 trials, respectively. The two analyses were
applied to the observed scores, this being repeated 10,000 times. d0d = true direct sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity.
Table 5
Proportion of samples classified in each outcome category (see Table 1) in simulation 5.
Analysis method
Double t-test method Indirect measure Direct measure
p > 0.05 p < 0.05
p > 0.05 23% 1%
p < 0.05 72% 4%
Double B method Indirect measure Direct measure
B < 1/3 Inconclusive B > 3
B < 1/3 2% 1% 0%
Inconclusive 19% 7% 1%
B > 3 51% 18% 2%
Note. Forty observers’ values of true d0 i were drawn from a bivariate distribution with l = 0 and r = 0.1 truncated at 0.True d0d = 0 for all observers. d0d and d0 i
were observed based on nd = 100 trials and ni = 200 trials, respectively. The two analyses were applied to the observed scores, this being repeated 10,000
times. d0d = true direct sensitivity; d0 i = true indirect sensitivity; d0d = observed direct sensitivity; d0 i = observed indirect sensitivity.
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The previous simulations suggest that, due to random error in the measurements, the double t-test method leads to a high
rate of false support for subliminal priming. Perhaps random error can also hide true subliminal priming? We tested this
with a final simulation identical to Simulation 2 except that d0d was set to 0 for all observers (that is, we assumed that d0d
and d0i were dissociated). Table 5 summarizes the results of applying the double t-test and double B method in this simula-
tion. As can be seen, only 4% (a = 5%) of the direct measures were significant and very few simulations led to B > 3 for the
direct measure. We conclude that random error lead to very few missed instances of subliminal priming for either analytical
method. The slightly greater conservatism in classifying samples as subliminal when calculating B stems from the random
error inherent in using only 100 trials to measure perception. Erring on the side of caution is not necessarily a fault, however.
An inconclusive B will encourage researchers to collect more data; a valid procedure using Bayesian statistics, Dienes, 2011).
8. Concluding remarks
8.1. Measurement error
In the simulations, assumption (c) (see Section 2.1 above) was that the observers’ true sensitivity remained constant dur-
ing all trials of the experiment. This means that the measurement error simulated here is the random error inherent in the
binomial nature of the two alternative forced-choice methods. As the simulations illustrate, such random error affects the
conclusions that can be made. Another type of measurement error, not simulated here, stems from the fact that an observer’s
true sensitivity may not remain constant throughout an experiment. Because of lapses of attention, motivation, or fatigue, a
participant may perform sub-optimally. If such attention-driven measurement error affects both the direct and indirect mea-
sures similarly, this type of measurement error would not constitute a serious problem for experimenters investigating sub-
liminal priming. However, because the direct task is often more difficult and is often performed at the end of the experiment,
the direct measure may be more negatively affected by such measurement error (Newell & Shanks, 2014; Pratte & Rouder,
2009). Other factors that also have been suggested to negatively affect performance in the direct measure is task instructions
(Lin & Murray, 2014) and prime-target stimuli similarity (Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 2012). As this would lead to underesti-
mation of d0d, this would increase the risk of false support for subliminal priming beyond what the present simulations
suggest.
8.2. Effect size in the indirect measure
In simulations 1–3, d0 was used for both the direct and indirect measures. This ensured that the true effect size was the
same in both measures (because d0d = d0i). As actual experiments often use different outcome variables for the direct and indi-
rect measures (e.g., d0d and a congruency effect on RT), the effect size and thus power do not need to be similar for the two
measures. Perhaps marginally or infrequently perceiving a prime stimulus (d0d slightly above 0) could produce relatively
strong congruency effects. This would lead to samples in which the mean d0d may approach chance but median priming
effects are subtantial. As this would lead to more power in the indirect measure, the previous simulations may underesti-
mate the extent of false support for subliminal priming in the literature.
8.3. Conclusions
The main result of the present simulations is that conventional tests of subliminal priming are not robust. A non-
significant direct measure combined with a significant indirect measure does not constitute a reliable diagnostic of sublim-
inal priming, as this result is common even when the only participants who are primed also perceive the prime. Furthermore,
finding priming among a subgroup of observers performing close to chance is not a reliable diagnostic of subliminal priming
because of random error in the direct measure. If anything, grouping observers based on performance on the direct measure
leads to more error than does analyzing the full sample. Finally, as already suggested by Miller (2000), regression analysis
will often result in a statistically significant intercept even though there is no dissociation between the direct and indirect
measures. In summary, the tests of subliminal priming commonly used in the literature do not support the conclusion exper-
imenters want to make.
These simulations do not suggest that subliminal priming cannot occur or that it has not occurred in various studies.
However, they do indicate that, with the experimental parameters used in many studies (e.g., González-García et al.,
2015; Huang et al., 2014; Jusyte & Schönenberg, 2014; Kido & Makioka, 2015; Kiefer et al., 2015; Lin & Murray, 2015;
Marcos Malmierca, 2015; Norman et al., 2015; Ocampo, 2015; Ocampo et al., 2015; Schoeberl et al., 2015; Wildegger
et al., 2015), the error rate of falsely declaring priming to be subliminal can be as high as 30–50% (Figs. 2 and 3). This casts
doubt on the strength of the evidence for some types of subliminal priming reported in the literature.
In all simulations, testing subliminal priming based on Bayesian statistics outperformed the conventional analyses and
was much less likely to falsely declare subliminal priming. This is because the Bayes factor distinguishes between data that
support H0 and data that are inconclusive, which the p-value cannot do. Our recommendation for experimenters interested
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inal. Dienes (2015) presents a good discussion of how H1 can be specified in this context. Note, however, that calculating a
Bayes factor tests only whether or not mean performance is at chance levels. A Bayes factor that supports H0 (i.e., B < 1/3)
does not imply that the prime stimulus was subliminal for all participants. As such, even B < 1/3 does not exclude the pos-
sibility that priming was in fact was driven by a few observers who perceived the prime.
The main difficulty in supporting a claim that priming is subliminal is that observers differ in their absolute thresholds
(e.g., Albrecht & Mattler, 2012; Dagenbach et al., 1989; Greenwald et al., 1995; Haase & Fisk, 2015; Sand, 2016). This means
that a certain prime stimulus intensity will likely be subliminal for some observers and supraliminal for others. Estimating a
threshold for each observer on the other hand, may also be problematic (Rouder et al., 2007). It is therefore unfortunate that
the regression approach based on taking individual variability in perception into account has a large error rate. However,
part of the reason why regression often fails in this context is a lack of range in d0d. This occurs because experimenters
try to use a prime stimulus setting that is subliminal for all observers. For another approach that use a range of d0d for which
regression analysis is more robust, see Sand (2016) or Haase and Fisk (2015).
There is a growing concern about false positive psychology (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) and the replicability of
psychological findings (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). We submit that false positive findings may arise from faulty
interpretation of non-significant results. Problems associated with interpreting p > a (failure to reject H0) and how this sit-
uation could be improved by Bayesian statistics, have been discussed at length elsewhere (Dienes, 2014; Gallistel, 2009). Our
simulations also suggest that false positives may well be replicable if several experimenters use similar paradigms and ques-
tionable analytical strategies. We therefore hope that the field of subliminal priming will start using other experimental
designs and statistical approaches to test subliminal priming.Acknowledgments
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